1 2	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION			
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4	JAMES DEAN, JR., et al.,			
5	Plaintiffs, Oocket No. 09 C 1190			
6	vs.			
7	CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Chicago, Illinois August 15, 2012			
8	Defendants.) 4:00 p.m.			
9	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS			
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MATTHEW F. KENNELLY			
11	APPEARANCES:			
12	ALL ENVINCES.			
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1 (The following proceedings were had in open court:) THE CLERK: 09 C 1990, Dean v. City. 2 3 MS. HAMILTON: Good morning, your Honor; Torri 4 Hamilton on behalf of plaintiff. 5 MR. PETRARCA: Good morning, your Honor; Chris 6 Petrarca, also on behalf of Mr. Dean. 7 MS. HAMILTON: Good afternoon. 8 MR. ERICKSON: Good afternoon; Jon Erickson 9 on behalf of plaintiff. MS. LI: Good afternoon, your Honor; Jane Li on 10 11 behalf of plaintiff. 12 MR. KOWALCZYK: Good afternoon, your Honor; Larry 13 Kowalczyk on behalf of Officer Fiorito, here with Stacey 14 Atkins and Ghazal Sharifi from our office. 15 MR. NOLAND: Good afternoon, your Honor; Dan Noland 16 for the City. 17 THE COURT: I'm sorry. I didn't catch the other 18 person's name. You're Stacey Atkins. 19 MS. ATKINS: I am. THE COURT: I didn't catch your name. 20 21 MS. SHARIFI: Ghazal Sharifi, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Okay. You should spell that. 23 MS. SHARIFI: Sure. The last name is S, as in Sam, 24 h-a-r-i-f, as in Frank, i. First name is Ghazal, G-h-a-z, as 25 in zebra, a-1.

1 THE COURT: All right. So why don't we deal with Mr. 2 Noland's issue first. 3 So if I'm understanding this correctly, and you'll 4 correct me if I'm wrong, I may be doing this a bit too much 5 forest and not enough trees. The City's position -- Mr. 6 Noland being the lawyer for the City -- the City's position is 7 that the Monell claim has been severed for trial. The other 8 claim against the City is an indemnification claim under 745 ILCS 10/9102, and there is no real good reason to have that 9 10 being part of the trial. 11 MR. NOLAND: That's our position. There is, I think, 12 a vicarious liability assertion. 13 THE COURT: On the state law claim. 14 MR. NOLAND: Yes. 15 THE COURT: Yes, okay. And the plaintiffs' position 16 is we're not dropping the indemnification claim or the 17 respondeat claim. 18 MS. HAMILTON: Correct, Judge. 19 THE COURT: So you tell me what the authority is for 20 me to tell them they have to drop it. 21 MR. NOLAND: Judge, we have been involved in three 22 cases where the stipulation has been accepted. One case was 23 Jimenez before your Honor.

THE COURT: That was a whole different story.

mean, it really was. It was a whole different story, and it

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was -- I mean, the plaintiff agreed to it in that situation.

MR. NOLAND: Yes.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. NOLAND: The other two we were involved in were Evans and Thompsen which were similar situations to Jimenez.

And ultimately there is no direct claim against the City. The jury is not going to be deciding anything against the City. It is -- as a result, the City would only be in there as a potential deep pocket.

By operation of stipulation, depending on the verdict, there will be a judgment entered by your Honor either for or against the City. By operation of law, under the indemnity statute as well as the vicarious liability principles, there is going to be the judgment entered against the City. We're not saying we're dismissed from the case. The City will be -- either way there's going to be a judgment either for or against based on what the jury finds as to Officer Fiorito. So, therefore, the only --

There is no issue for the jury to decide as to the City. We're just an entity there. Officer Fiorito is there. The jury will know that he was a Chicago police officer. We think that there being no issue for the jury to decide against the City, that the City should not be on the verdict form or mentioned at trial. The plaintiffs previously didn't quarrel with this proposition.

THE COURT: When you say they didn't quarrel with it, 1 2 what exactly do you mean by that? 3 MR. NOLAND: Well, in addition to accepting the 4 stipulation or the bifurcation, just a couple weeks ago when I initially made this point to the plaintiffs' counsel, they 5 6 simply said, thanks for your response. 7 THE COURT: Well, it doesn't mean they didn't object. 8 I mean, it just means they -- it sounds kind of like what we were told was I hear what you're saying. 9 10 I would have expected at that time they MR. NOLAND: 11 would have said, you know, Dan, we disagree with you. 12 expect you're going to be sitting at counsel table or the City 13 is going to be involved. 14 So just fundamentally, Judge, there is no claim, I 15 think, perhaps under Rule 403. 16 THE COURT: To be clear about that, there's a claim. 17 You have stipulated to liability on it, but there is a claim. 18 MR. NOLAND: You're right. 19 THE COURT: In fact, there's two. 20 MR. NOLAND: True enough. There is nothing for the 21 jury to decide against the City I think is the point I'm 22 trying to make. 23 Okay. What would you like to tell me THE COURT: 24 about this? 25 MS. HAMILTON: Just, Judge, that the City is, in

fact, the defendant, and there are Illinois pattern jury instructions that instruct the jury as to the state law claim about principal and agency, and we have submitted a form of that instruction that your Honor had given in a previous case that I tried before your Honor, and I just don't feel that there's -- I don't see the reason why we would keep that hidden from the jury. There is just no legal authority to keep the fact that the City is a defendant, which they are, from the jury.

THE COURT: Yes. I mean, frankly, I'm not prepared to accept the proposition that there's either a legal basis or, even if there is a legal basis, a good reason to force somebody to accept a stipulation.

So it would kind of be like -- you know, when we were talking about to some extent state law claims, it would be kind of like if you have an auto accident claim against a truck driver who is driving a truck for a company and the company comes in -- and you sue, as you always do, the truck driver and the company, or as you almost always do, the truck driver and the company. And the company comes in and says, we stipulate and, therefore, you should drop us from the case, Judge. I mean, I just -- I think that is not the predominant practice, and I'm not going to force it on somebody against their will. So there's your answer.

So I want to start off with the defense motions in

limine.

And, by the way, as I was going back through the opinion, there were a handful of typo type things that I'm probably going to fix in a day or two which I missed the first time around, the opinion on summary judgment, in other words.

So on the defense motions in limine, I think the -- MS. HAMILTON: Do you want us at the table or do you want us up here?

THE COURT: Well, if somebody is going to be talking, I want you up here, but you don't all have to be standing up here all the time. That's my answer.

MS. HAMILTON: All right.

THE COURT: Okay. So the first defense motion in limine is to bar a reference to mental incapacity or illness. And the plaintiffs' response to that is they're not going to offer any testimony, and they don't have a problem with precluding any mention of any diagnosis of a mental illness or disability but do object to Mr. Dean being barred from testifying about the state of his mental health and whatever symptoms he claims to have.

So tell me the position on that on the defense side. That would be you.

MS. ATKINS: Yes, your Honor, I was just getting my stuff in order. I apologize.

On the defense end, we would --

THE COURT: In other words, he's not going to be able to get up on the stand and say, I have PTSD.

MS. ATKINS: Exactly.

THE COURT: Or that I've been diagnosed that I have PTSD, but the plaintiffs want to be able -- the plaintiffs' lawyers want to be able to say, you know, what are your symptoms. I have sleepless nights, I'm depressed, I'm that kind of thing.

MS. ATKINS: Your Honor, of course we have -- we have no problem with him discussing on the stand that he has sleepless nights and stomach aches, et cetera, but he did testify in his deposition, I need not be diagnosed with PTSD to have it. And he proffered his own opinion that he had PTSD.

And then also our concern arose from the plaintiffs' offered venire questions number 1 and 2 that talked about --

THE COURT: I will deal with that later.

MS. ATKINS: Okay. But we have no problem with him talking about his experiences, what he's experiencing, but we certainly don't want to allow him to be to able self-diagnose in the absence of any medical practitioner.

THE COURT: So it sounds like both sides, at least the people who are here in the room right now, which does not include Mr. Dean, are all on the same page on this one. Does that sound right?

MS. HAMILTON: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: So here's the deal. And, you know, it doesn't matter that Mr. Dean is not here, of course, but that just makes it doubly incumbent on the plaintiffs' attorneys to carefully instruct him regarding what is in bounds and what is out of bounds either on this topic or on any other topics I have to deal with.

And please include in your discussion that what is going to happen if he goes out of bounds is that objections are going to get sustained, testimony is going to get stricken, he's going to be instructed in the presence of the jury to confine his testimony to the rules as I've set them, as they exist under the law. And the progressive discipline, if you will, goes up from there.

So you will do that, right?

MS. HAMILTON: Absolutely, Judge.

THE COURT: So I think that what's been discussed -- so motion in limine number 1 is granted in part, denied in part. No testimony about diagnosis. It's okay for him to testify about symptoms.

Item number two, this has to do with other lawsuits, incidents, et cetera, regarding Mr. Fiorito. And so I want to get a handle -- because I don't think I really got it at least as well as I need it from the response. What exactly is it that the plaintiff proposes to offer relating to other

incidents regarding Mr. Fiorito?

MS. HAMILTON: Okay, Judge, there are several, the first being --

The first that comes to mind for me would be the sustained CR for putting false information in police reports. That I think comes in under 608(b). We think it's fair game for us to ask him about it. It was a CR investigation that was conducted.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm just looking for the laundry list at this point.

MS. HAMILTON: Then we have some 404(b) witnesses that we have put on our witness list that the defendants have objected to that I'm sure that we're going to have to go through. So under -- so there's those witnesses and their testimony about Officer Fiorito's arrest of them.

And then further, we do intend to ask the state's attorney -- one of the state's attorney -- former state's attorney witnesses that we have on our witness list about the 134 cases that were dismissed -- not about each case, but the fact that there was 134 DUI cases brought and put into the system by Officer Fiorito that were then dismissed. And it is our position, and I can give you the argument on why we think it's admissible under 404(b), if you're ready for that now, but that's the list.

THE COURT: Okay. So let's talk about that last

thing first. Give me the theory as to its admissibility.

MS. HAMILTON: Yes, okay.

So, Judge, we believe that -- so this evidence, the 404(b) evidence, we're seeking to introduce doesn't have to do with Officer Fiorito's character. It has to do -- it has been the plaintiffs' position from the beginning on this case and from the original complaint that's ever been filed that Officer Fiorito had a scheme, a common pattern, of the way that he behaved, and the motive of which, which is another reason why we would bring this in to show motive, was greed.

He became a police officer at age 50. He only had either 12 or 13 years to accumulate a pension or to save enough money in order to retire. And during that time, he made -- for several years he was engaging in this pattern of false DUI arrests, arresting people when he did not have probable cause to arrest them for DUI in order to both -- for motive for both greed, and also we believe his hatred of minorities, people that had a sexual preference that was different than his own.

So we think that there's a couple of different, both motive and common scheme and design.

THE COURT: So how does the dismissal of the 134 cases, or whatever it was, relate to that?

MS. HAMILTON: I think that it tends to show that he did not -- that he had multiple arrests, multiple cases that

1 he put in, that were dismissed because the state's attorney 2 wasn't going to proceed on them. I think it tends to show --3 all this tends to show lack of probable cause. 4 So what we have to prove is we have to show that he 5 did not have probable cause to arrest and he did not have 6 probable cause to prosecute or to cause Mr. Dean to be 7 prosecuted. If he was engaged in this common plan based on 8 his motives of greed and his hatred towards black people, 9 Hispanic people and gay people, then that tends to show that 10 he didn't have probable cause, that he was --11 So it goes towards the probable cause analysis. 12 That's our belief. It's not being shown as improper character 13 evidence against Officer Fiorito. 14 THE COURT: Okay, I understand your reasoning on that 15 one. 16 So on item number one, which was the sustained CR, 17 give me a little bit more detail about your take on what the 18 sustained CR involved. 19 MS. HAMILTON: The sustained CR involved a Sergeant 20 Hitaris who responded to the scene where --21 THE COURT: A sergeant named Harris, you said? 22 MS. HAMILTON: Hitaris. 23 THE COURT: Hitaris, okay. 24 MS. HAMILTON: Hitaris, who responded to the scene of 25 a DUI arrest that Officer Fiorito was making, had some

observations about the arrest, and then took a couple of days 1 2 off work, and when he returned and he reviewed the arrest 3 report that Officer Fiorito had created as a result of that 4 DUI arrest, he found things in the report that were false. 5 And he initiated a CR based on that, which was ultimately 6 sustained by the police department. 7 THE COURT: I know the police department has various 8 ways of characterizing things. What was the charge that was 9 sustained? 10 MS. HAMILTON: I would have to get that for you, but 11 I believe it was false information in a police report. 12 (Brief interruption.) 13 THE COURT: In terms of item number two, which was 14 what you referred to as the 404(b) witnesses, how many other 15 incidents are we talking about? 16 MS. HAMILTON: Three, one of them being Mr. Lopez. 17 THE COURT: Lopez, and what are the other two? 18 MS. HAMILTON: Bonnie Klein, and Kevin Pipkens. 19 THE COURT: Pickens? 20 MS. HAMILTON: P-i-p-k-e-n-s. 21 THE COURT: Pipkens, okay. 22 MS. HAMILTON: Yes. 23 THE COURT: And give me the thumbnail sketch version 24 of Lopez, Klein and Pipkens. 25 MS. HAMILTON: Of Lopez?

THE COURT: Of what happened in each one of those situations, at least as you believe the evidence would play out.

MS. HAMILTON: Yes. Well, the similarities between them, they're all DUI arrests. They're all -- the reports, if you look at all the reports, you know, strikingly similar allegations by Officer Fiorito.

THE COURT: When you say "strikingly similar," what is strikingly similar?

MS. HAMILTON: They have to escorted because they're falling down. They fall out of their car. They have to -- they can't -- they have to lean back in their car to avoid falling down, said that about Pipkens, said the same exact thing about Steven Lopez in his deposition.

THE COURT: And does the report on Mr. Dean say something similar to that?

MS. HAMILTON: Mr. Dean says -- or he says about Mr. Dean that he had to be escorted because he tripped walking up the stairs into the interview area.

They all talk about how -- all the reports talk about how the individual arrestees were all insulting, and all the arrestees all say that Officer Fiorito was actually the one that was swearing at them and using -- Bonnie Klein says he called her a dyke.

James Dean says that he asked him, I think you

already know -- he referred to him with the term "nigger," and he told Steven Lopez to "shut the fuck up." Excuse my language. And he used derogatory terms about Mr. Pipkens' sexual preferences to Mr. Pipkens.

So we think that there's enough similarity between all of them. They're all close in time, within a couple of years at the outset, of Mr. Dean's arrest.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Atkins.

MS. ATKINS: Where would you like me begin, your Honor?

THE COURT: I think go through them in the same sequence that I talked about them with Ms. Hamilton.

MS. ATKINS: So beginning with the 144 cases that were dismissed, your Honor, counsel says that this is going to show something toward a conspiracy on the part of Officer Fiorito, this grand scheme that he had.

Your Honor, there are only two counts in this case against Mr. Fiorito. There isn't a claim for conspiracy. As to any allegations as to a sexual orientation animus motive on the part of Officer Fiorito, Mr. Dean himself in his deposition said that that was never a claim.

THE COURT: So I've got to disabuse you of that. I mean, I guess I hear pretty frequently in employment discrimination cases that, well, the plaintiff said in his deposition, I can't say that this person is a racist.

Evidence doesn't all have to come from the plaintiff.

MS. ATKINS: I understand that, your Honor.

THE COURT: And so if there is -- if there is some other evidence in the case whether the plaintiff, you know, is aware of it or not, and the other evidence is legitimately admissible, that shows that a particular motive or reason for acting or whatever, the fact that the plaintiff might not have known about it I think is kind of beside the point.

MS. ATKINS: Well, your Honor, it's the state's attorney's decision to dismiss these 144 cases. If there's transcripts or other evidence indicating that the sole basis for those dismissals was because of Officer Fiorito's greed, scheme, conspiracy, animus towards specific racial or sexual groups, I don't know how they would aid in showing anything toward the probable cause for the arrest of James Dean.

THE COURT: Well, there's a claim for punitive damages here, too, right, and there's a claim for malicious prosecution, and so on both of those things, the person's -- the defendant's state of mind is more an issue than it would be on a probable cause thing. On the probable cause, it's, you know, largely a question of what was the information he or she had.

Let me ask you this. Were these cases all dismissed en masse or were they dismissed one at a time, or how did it happen?

1 MS. HAMILTON: En masse. 2 THE COURT: And not that this is a controlling 3 factor. 4 MS. HAMILTON: I'm sorry, Judge. I need to correct 5 that. 6 MS. ATKINS: You have been misinformed. 7 MS. HAMILTON: If I could just have a second. 8 MR. ERICKSON: The answer is not really yes. 9 decision to dismiss all of --THE COURT: You know what, since I'm guessing that 10 11 since you were not an assistant state's attorney at the time, 12 you can't tell me from personal knowledge what the decision 13 was or why the decision was. I'm just asking, were they all 14 dismissed en masse? 15 MR. ERICKSON: That's what I was answering. 16 THE COURT: Let's get to it more directly because it's 4:15 in the afternoon. 17 18 MR. ERICKSON: They were dismissed. The decision to 19 dismiss all of his DUIs was made at once. 20 THE COURT: At one time. And they got dismissed over 21 a period. 22 MR. ERICKSON: They were dismissed as the cases 23 appeared in court. 24 Is there anything --THE COURT: Fine. 25 Not that this is a controlling factor, and maybe not

1 even a significant factor -- I just want to know -- is there 2 anything of record where the prosecutor explains the 3 dismissals? Typically there wouldn't be. It would be --4 MS. ATKINS: No, I'm not aware. 5 THE COURT: It would be motion state SOL or motion 6 state nolle pros. That's kind of the way it's usually said. 7 MS. ATKINS: I'm not aware of anything above and 8 beyond. 9 THE COURT: And was the prosecutor that you're 10 talking about --11 Is it a he or a she? 12 MS. HAMILTON: It's a he. 13 THE COURT: He. Was he deposed in this case? 14 MS. HAMILTON: He was not. 15 THE COURT: Okay. As you stand there right now, do 16 you have any belief as to what he would say if asked why the 17 134, as you said, or 144, as she said, cases were dismissed? 18 MS. HAMILTON: No. I mean --19 THE COURT: In a temporal sense, when did these 20 dismissals occur vis a vis the grand jury investigation that I 21 keep hearing about? Were they around the time that it became 22 known? 23 MS. HAMILTON: Yes. 24 THE COURT: So isn't it likely that if we really 25 pushed this person on an answer, what they're likely to come

out with is we didn't think we could pursue this case because the man was under a grand jury investigation, which you know gosh darned well that you're never going to get in at this trial?

MS. ATKINS: Your Honor, he also wasn't --

THE COURT: I didn't ask you a question.

MS. HAMILTON: Yes, I believe that may come out. I'm not -- that may be the reason why they were ultimately dismissed.

I do know that with respect to Mr. Dean's case, that there will be evidence. I will be able to present evidence at trial that his case was dismissed because it was a bad case.

THE COURT: But you're going to get to present evidence about why his case was dismissed because that's part of what you have to prove --

MS. HAMILTON: Right.

THE COURT: -- you know, on the malicious prosecution claim.

I guess my concern about this is that I don't know that the dismissal of these cases really tells anybody much of anything about, you know, Mr. Fiorito's motive. I mean, it maybe gives you some sense of some third party, some nonparty's, assessment of how good the cases were, but I think that it's -- I think it's the type of thing that doesn't have a terrifically high degree of probative value, and I think the

possibility of, you know -- the possibility of us getting into 1 2 an area that is clearly going to be out of bounds is fairly 3 significant, number one. 4 And, number two, even if that were not the case, I just think we're going to get into a detour into what was 5 6 going on in each of those 134 or 144 cases. So I don't think that's admissible. 7 8 So the next item is the --9 MS. HAMILTON: Okay, Judge. 10 THE COURT: -- the CR. 11 MS. ATKINS: The CR, your Honor, the sustained 12 finding was relative to Officer Fiorito counting minutes of 13 the transport into the 20-minute required time frame, the 14 observation period. 15 Furthermore, so there was no finding that he 16 falsified any information. 17 THE COURT: What was the finding? 18 MS. ATKINS: The finding was sustained, and I can 19 actually read the finding to your Honor. I just --20 THE COURT: This is an exhibit somewhere, right? 21 MS. ATKINS: This is an exhibit. This was an 22 exhibit. 23 THE COURT: Which exhibit number? 24 MS. ATKINS: Is it one of plaintiffs' exhibits? 25 MS. SHARIFI: Exhibit 3 plaintiffs', response to

defendants. 1 2 THE COURT: Exhibit 3. I've got as Exhibit 3 part of 3 Mr. Dean's --4 MS. HAMILTON: Exhibit 1 to plaintiff Dean's exhibits 5 to its responses to defendant Fiorito's motions in limine. 6 THE COURT: There it is. I've got it right here. 7 That's right. I couldn't make head nor tail out of 8 I looked at this. I couldn't figure it out. 9 I mean, in terms of exactly what the charge was, it 10 really didn't tell me much of anything. 11 MS. ATKINS: Okay. I can read you --12 THE COURT: Or what the finding was, rather. 13 No, I've got the document. Tell me where to look. 14 What page do I look on? 15 MS. ATKINS: It would be --16 Does yours have the case docket stamp on the top, your Honor? Or it is City 9338. 17 18 THE COURT: Is it page 8 of 22? 19 MS. ATKINS: The one I have is 82 pages long. 20 Okay. There's a little number in the THE COURT: 21 lower right-hand corner. What's the number in the lower 22 right-hand corner, Ms. Atkins, of what you're looking at? 23 The City number, your Honor? Is that MS. HAMILTON: 24 what you're asking? 25 MS. ATKINS: You have a City number there, your

Honor.

THE COURT: Lower right-hand corner.

MS. ATKINS: City 9338. Or if yours is the 23-page one, it is --

THE COURT: 9338, no, I've got it. Those numbers are so small that I have to really expand them significantly.

9338, I'm there. "Sustained violation of general order 010303A and that the accused... purposely did not complete the warning to motorists in the 20-minute observation period, to wit: The accused improperly conducted the 20-minute observation period during a DUI arrest by utilizing the documented transport time as part of the observation period."

That's what you are referring to?

MS. ATKINS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm asking Ms. Hamilton this question. How does that constitute a finding that he falsified something?

MS. HAMILTON: Because he then put in his report that he did complete the 20-minute. And if you look at previous pages and you look at what the actual allegations made by Sergeant Hitaris were, this is I think a common thing that happens a lot of times in these investigations is when they actually are going to sustain it, they sustain it based on perhaps the least --

1 THE COURT: Yes, but, okay, so you're going to --2 What you're just saying right now, do you have a 3 witness who is going to testify to that? 4 MS. HAMILTON: Okay, yes. No. no. 5 THE COURT: That would be a no, right? 6 MS. HAMILTON: I was looking to ask --7 THE COURT: No, no, I understand. But you're trying 8 to tell me -- what you were about to tell me or --9 MS. HAMILTON: What I'm about to tell you --10 THE COURT: What you were getting in to tell me was 11 that, no, they always explain it in a way that makes it look 12 less damaging to the officer, okay. Maybe that's true, maybe 13 it's not, but there is no witness who's going to testify to 14 that in this case. 15 So let's confine what we're talking about about 16 evidence that is going to come in. 17 MS. HAMILTON: Fair enough. 18 So that was what was sustained. The allegations as I 19 had explained them to your Honor previously, if you look at a 20 couple of pages before, if you look at page 9335, you can read 21 for yourself, you know, why Sergeant Hitaris actually 22 initiated the investigation was that he looked at the reports 23 and that it would be impossible --24 THE COURT: And Fiorito explained when he was

interviewed that he counted the travel time, or he counted the

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travel time as part of the 20 minutes, and the finding basically is you can't count that 20 minutes or you can't count that time as part of the 20 minutes. I don't see this as a --

I mean, you know, if all of us were to sit back and kind of analyze it and massage it, you might say, okay, well, he was fudging the rules or he was fudging what he said. I mean, I don't think that's what the finding is. And, you know, you don't have that type of a claimed misrepresentation in this case, at least that I'm aware of, on the part of Fiorito. So I'm excluding that as well.

I don't even think that's relevant. And even if it is, I think the possibility of confusion and the need -- all of the evidence that would be needed to explain it I think far outweighs the limited probative value that it has.

So that leaves us with what's been referred to as the 404(b); namely, the other incidents. So let me hear from you on that.

MS. ATKINS: Your Honor, I will begin with Mr. Lopez. As your Honor might be aware, Mr. Lopez was named plaintiff in this matter. His matter has been settled.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. ATKINS: I can't imagine that he would bring anything toward the table relative to the probable cause for the arrest of Mr. Dean.

1 THE COURT: Yes, and so let me -- just to have you 2 talking about the thing that I'm interested in here, it 3 basically has to do with what I would call motive evidence and 4 possibly, if what Ms. Hamilton says is right, about 5 similarity, misrepresentations or similarity of statements, 6 possibly modus operandi evidence. So talk about it with that 7 in mind. 8 MS. ATKINS: Your Honor, in that respect, as you can 9 imagine, using the same descriptive terms for people who are 10 intoxicated is not unusual. But these --11 THE COURT: There's only so many ways you can 12 manifest being drunk. 13 MS. ATKINS: Absolutely. Thick tongue --14 THE COURT: I don't know. Can I take a poll of 15 everybody in the room on that one? I'm being facetious. 16 Go ahead. It's all right. 17 MS. ATKINS: Your Honor, we also, relative to Mr. 18

MS. ATKINS: Your Honor, we also, relative to Mr. Lopez, we have a disclosure issue with him as well. He was not disclosed as a witness for Mr. Dean. The fact that he may have been disclosed back in his own case as providing testimony relative to anything relative to motive or intent of Officer Fiorito, that doesn't necessarily mean that we are to suppose that he is going to come in as a 404(b) witness.

THE COURT: How are you harmed? You took his deposition, right?

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1 MS. ATKINS: I'm sorry? 2 THE COURT: How are you harmed? You took his 3 deposition, right? 4 MS. ATKINS: Well, we did take his deposition, your 5 Honor. 6 THE COURT: Right. 37(c)(1) talks about 7 nondisclosure. You exclude the person unless it's 8 substantially justified or harmless. 9 So how are you harmed, by the fact that they didn't 10 put him on the list until recently? 11 MS. ATKINS: The fact that he didn't put him on the 12 list. 13 Okay. What's your next point? THE COURT: 14 MS. ATKINS: Then we have got Bonnie Klein. 15 THE COURT: What is your next point on him because I 16 don't find that in the least bit persuasive. 17 (Brief interruption.) 18 THE COURT: I mean, I assume you have some 19 overarching argument that relates to all three of these 20 people. 21 MS. ATKINS: The overarching argument relative to 22 these 404(b) witnesses is that they are not substantially 23 similar. Their experiences are not substantially similar to 24 Mr. Dean. 25 THE COURT: So I have a pretty good handle on what

the scenario is that both sides have given relating to 1 2 Mr. Dean. 3 MS. ATKINS: Sure. 4 THE COURT: I have less of a scenario as it relates 5 to Mr. Lopez, Ms. Klein and Mr. Pipkens. So can you give me anything about, you know, sort of 6 7 a thumbnail sketch of what the scenario is for those three 8 people? 9 MS. ATKINS: Your Honor, I think the most important 10 thing here is that Mr. Dean did not take a Breathalyzer. 11 THE COURT: Yes. 12 MS. ATKINS: Mr. Pipkens did and blew a .19. 13 THE COURT: The number is .08 that you have to 14 exceed? 15 MS. ATKINS: Yes. 16 THE COURT: He blew .19. 17 MS. ATKINS: A .19. 18 THE COURT: All right. 19 MS. ATKINS: Bonnie Klein. Mr. Dean didn't plead 20 guilty. Ms. Klein did. 21 THE COURT: Pled guilty? 22 MS. ATKINS: Pled guilty to a DUI. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MS. ATKINS: Mr. Lopez is married. He's not a 25 homosexual. So I don't know what they could bring into the

1 table. 2 THE COURT: Okay, back up again. So Pipkens blew 3 .19. 4 MS. ATKINS: Yes. 5 THE COURT: Klein pled guilty. 6 MS. ATKINS: Yes. 7 THE COURT: And so putting aside what Mr. Lopez's 8 sexual orientation is or isn't --9 MS. ATKINS: Sure. 10 THE COURT: -- what are the circumstances surrounding 11 his arrest, at least as you understand them? Lopez. 12 MR. KOWALCZYK: I apologize. 13 THE COURT: That's fine. I don't care who says it. 14 Go ahead. 15 MR. KOWALCZYK: As I understand it, Mr. Lopez was out 16 for the evening dancing with a friend, and on the way out, 17 Officer Fiorito will testify that his lights were not on. 18 There is an automatic feature on his lights which he admitted 19 to. He claims the lights were on, was pulled over, was made 20 to do field sobriety tests. 21 THE COURT: Okav. 22 MR. KOWALCZYK: He did indicate that he had a leg 23 issue from a prior injury. So an issue there was he failed 24 the test or apparently didn't do as well on the test because 25 of his Achilles tendon issue. We did get the medical records

of Lopez regarding that. It was an old injury.

But Officer Fiorito, I believe, testified that he allowed him to use whichever leg he wanted to stand on. I think it was the standing test. So he did go through field sobriety tests, was arrested for DUI.

The case was later either nolled or SOL'd. I don't know the disposition exactly, but I believe it was nolled.

THE COURT: Ms. Hamilton, let me ask you a couple of questions about each of these other people. So as I understand it, Mr. Dean is going to testify that at some point Mr. Fiorito used the N word, right?

MS. HAMILTON: Yes.

THE COURT: Is he going testify -- as you understand it, is he going to testify at the trial -- not whether he testified at the deposition -- is he going to testify at the trial that Mr. Fiorito made any reference to his sexual orientation?

MS. HAMILTON: No.

THE COURT: Is he going to testify that he had any reason to believe that Mr. Fiorito was even aware of a sexual orientation?

MS. HAMILTON: I do not believe he is, no.

THE COURT: Okay. So I want to ask you about what you referred to as swearing, and what I wrote down was derogatory references with regard to each of these other

1 people. 2 What would Mr. Pipkens testify about whatever 3 swearing or derogatory references then Officer Fiorito made? 4 MS. HAMILTON: I'm going to ask Mr. Erickson to 5 answer that one. He knows Mr. Pipkens much better than I do. 6 MR. ERICKSON: Directed at sexual orientation. 7 were words like fag and queen. 8 THE COURT: How about Ms. Klein? 9 MS. HAMILTON: Dyke. 10 MR. ERICKSON: Dyke. 11 THE COURT: Okay. No racial reference. I don't know 12 their race, okay. 13 What about Mr. Lopez? 14 MS. HAMILTON: He was just swearing at Mr. Lopez, 15 telling him to -- which everybody says he did, a constant thing. 16 17 THE COURT: Like? 18 MS. HAMILTON: "Shut the fuck up" and "do the fucking 19 test" and just swearing at him. 20 THE COURT: And not to get into sort of, you know, a 21 question of how similar different swear words are, the swear 22 words that are most immediate in my memory in this case is 23 "goddamn." 24 MS. HAMILTON: Yes. 25 THE COURT: Okay. Is Mr. Dean going to say that

Fiorito used the F word?

MR. ERICKSON: I don't believe so.

THE COURT: Okay. I mean, these don't strike me as similar enough to be modus operandi evidence. I mean, nobody has told me that any of these situations are situations --

See, what we have got in this case, as I understand it, sort of from a 10,000 foot view, is Mr. Dean gets busted by the other officer, goes into the station. He takes care of his business, he comes back out. He's out by his car. At some point, Fiorito approaches the car, tells him to move the goddamned car.

Leaving out a lot of the intermediate stuff, Mr. Dean gets in the car, and he's going to testify that he pulled out into the traffic, pulled into the gas station across the street, did a three-point turn and went around and parked the car, at which point Fiorito comes and tells him again to move the goddamned car, which he does by pulling up past the next street, and then Fiorito then does the, quote, unquote, sobriety test and gives him a whole raft of tickets.

MS. HAMILTON: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there anything on Lopez, Klein or Pipkens that is at all like that in terms of how it played out?

I mean, what I have been told on Lopez -- it was either Pipkens or Lopez -- that it's like right after he comes

out of a bar, he gets busted, or pulled over. 1 2 MS. HAMILTON: On Lopez you're talking about? 3 THE COURT: I don't remember if it was Lopez or 4 Pipkens. 5 MS. HAMILTON: Shortly thereafter, yes. 6 And I think one of the things that we have heard time 7 and time again and we heard from all of these witnesses that 8 we're talking about here today are that he -- that Officer 9 Fiorito, the way that he administers these field sobriety 10 tests to all these people and to everybody else is he's screaming and swearing at all these people while they're 11 12 trying to do the test. So that's why I'm bringing that up. 13 I did not focus on that all that much as THE COURT: 14 it relates to Mr. Dean. 15 Is that what Mr. Dean's going to say? 16 MS. HAMILTON: That he was yelling at him and telling 17 him and swearing at him, I believe everybody says that. 18 THE COURT: While he was doing the field sobriety 19 test? 20 MR. ERICKSON: Yes. 21 MS. HAMILTON: Yes. 22 THE COURT: You're saying that all of these other 23 people would say something similar about that, that he's 24 screaming at you while you're doing the field sobriety tests, 25 which I suppose a reasonable person could say that's a way of

getting you to flunk. 1 2 MS. HAMILTON: Yes. 3 THE COURT: Or it's a way of getting you to appear to 4 flunk or something like that. I don't know. 5 MR. ERICKSON: They're divided attention tests, and 6 so they're designed to make your brain do one thing while your 7 body is doing another, and that's a distraction, to be yelled 8 at like that. 9 THE COURT: But are they all going to testify --10 would all four of these people, including Mr. Dean, Lopez, 11 Pipkens, and Klein all testify that while he was doing field 12 sobriety tests, he was screaming and yelling at them? 13 MR. ERICKSON: I believe they would all say that he 14 was belligerent, yes. 15 THE COURT: What do you say about that? You were 16 shaking your head, which I would appreciate it if you didn't do, actually, which I would appreciate if you didn't do. 17 18 MS. ATKINS: I'm sorry. It was involuntary. 19 THE COURT: Because that is distracting. I have to 20 do divided attention tests all the time, and you just divided 21 my attention the same third way that these guys said that 22 Fiorito did. I'm dead serious about this. It's really 23 annoying, so don't do it.

Okay. So now you can talk.

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MS. ATKINS: Again, I know from your prior comments

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that it's not what Dean testified to at his deposition; it's what he testifies to at trial. But at his deposition, none of the --Well, the only derogatory term allegedly uttered by Officer Fiorito took place after --THE COURT: The sobriety. MS. ATKINS: -- the tests were administered and he was walking across the street to the station. THE COURT: Was Mr. Dean asked at his deposition when he was doing the sobriety test, was Fiorito saying anything? MS. ATKINS: He was explaining the test to him. That's what Dean testified to. THE COURT: So Mr. Dean did not testify in his deposition that he was yelling at him, screaming at him, anything like that? MS. ATKINS: No. He yelled at him, allegedly yelled at him through the loudspeaker to move the goddamned car. THE COURT: No, that I know. MS. ATKINS: And beyond that, he explained the test to him during the administration. THE COURT: Pause. Is she misrepresenting the deposition? MS. HAMILTON: Judge, I wasn't at his deposition, but Mr. Petrarca just came to me -- Mr. Petrarca just whispered in my ear and said he was never asked that question.

MR. PETRARCA: I believe he was never asked that question.

MS. HAMILTON: That's what I was --

MR. ERICKSON: What Mr. Dean does say is that the belligerence level escalated from the beginning and all the way through, sort of culminating in the N word.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ERICKSON: Your Honor, if I may say something?

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. ERICKSON: Another similarity with all of these, or at least with regard to Pipkens and Dean and Klein, is the driving portion, that Officer Fiorito fabricates the probable cause to make the initial stop, and then he represents in his police reports and the litany of traffic citations that he issues and he exaggerates the bad driving that he needs to -- that the state needs to prove to the Court.

For example, with regard to James Dean, you're familiar with what James Dean's testimony was with regard to the driving, and yet Officer Fiorito has him driving left of center, failure to stay in the lane, stopping in the middle of an intersection and blocking it for two minutes, causing, you know, that kind of reckless driving.

With regard to Mr. Pipkens, he claims that
Mr. Pipkens over I believe it was a mile-and-a-half-period
length distance violated several traffic violations including

swerving in the other lane, violating traffic control devices, 1 2 et cetera. 3 And then with regard to Ms. Klein, she indicates 4 Mr. Pipkens had two DUIs with Officer Fiorito. One was -- the 5 defense was that he wasn't driving at all, and I believe that 6 is what Ms. Klein says, too. 7 THE COURT: So do you agree that Ms. Klein pled quilty to DUI? 8 9 MR. ERICKSON: Yes. 10 MS. HAMILTON: Supervision, Judge. 11 THE COURT: So you're going to say that when she 12 admitted her guilt, she wasn't telling the truth? She's going 13 to be a great witness for you. 14 MS. HAMILTON: Well, Judge, we actually --15 THE COURT: I mean, everybody in the room knows that 16 happens sometimes, okay. 17 All right. So here is what I think I need on this. 18 I don't have enough information. 19 MS. HAMILTON: Okay. 20 THE COURT: I need the following, and it's going to 21 have to be real fast because the trial is starting on Monday.

THE COURT: I need the following, and it's going to have to be real fast because the trial is starting on Monday. I need to see the police reports on all three of these folks. I don't think I've got those in here. I mean, I've got deposition testimony just from Dean and from Fiorito. I need -- I do not want -- please, please, please, I do not want the

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entirety of --1 2 Have any of them been deposed, all three of them or 3 just one? 4 MS. ATKINS: Two of them. 5 THE COURT: Lopez was deposed. 6 MR. KOWALCZYK: Lopez was deposed. Pipkens was 7 deposed. And I just got the dep today. Bonnie Klein was 8 served but never showed up. 9 THE COURT: Oh. Served by you but never showed up? 10 MR. KOWALCZYK: Well, by our investigator, yes, sir. 11 THE COURT: But she was served with a subpoena for a 12 deposition and didn't come in? 13 MR. KOWALCZYK: Yes. 14 THE COURT: Well, that would be another problem on 15 Ms. Klein. So do you have a ball park sense of how long the 16 17 Lopez and the Pipkens deps are? 18 MR. KOWALCZYK: I just got the Pipkens one today, 19 Judge. It's like 40 pages. I got it emailed to me. 20 MS. HAMILTON: Judge, I can simplify this. We'll 21 withdraw Ms. Klein as a potential witness based on our 22 conversations here today. 23 THE COURT: So what I need are the reports on Lopez 24 and Pipkens and Mr. Dean. I don't think I've got all of that 25 I may have it as part of the summary judgment stuff, but that's long ago in the blue bin.

And then I need the depositions of Lopez and Pipkens.

MR. KOWALCZYK: And I don't think Lopez is much

longer, Judge. It may be slightly longer because he's a

plaintiff.

THE COURT: All right. And I need them, like, by first thing in the morning, and then I will decide that later.

Now that we have done two motions in limine in 45 minutes, we're going to move on. So give me just a second here. So item number three -- I think we'll be moving quicker. We're not going to go past 5:00, and I'm going to make you come back tomorrow to finish up whatever we haven't finished up yet.

Item number three is indemnification and sending a message. So let me just tell you basically what the ground rules are on that. Well, there's going to be, as part of the jury instructions, a reference to the fact that the City is a defendant on, you know, certain claims and, you know, on whatever the elements of those are. And so I'm not trying to --

Nothing I say affects the jury instructions, and I have had at least a couple other cases where I've instructed on 9-102 claims. That aside, unless the issue of finances or ability to pay is injected into the case by the defendant, then the plaintiff doesn't get to bring up that there's

indemnification.

And so when I say "injected into the case," there's many ways that that can be injected into the case. And I'm not going to try to give a laundry list because I'm sure I would leave things out. But I'm assuming that everybody -- because you guys all do this for a living, that gives you enough guidance so that you know what is fair game and what isn't.

So the one addition to that is that if the plaintiff thinks that something has come in that brings this into play, you don't get to just mention it; you have to ask for a sidebar. Okay.

MS. HAMILTON: Of course, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. As far as sending a message is concerned, I mean, sending a message has to do with punitive damages which are, by definition, only going to be against Fiorito. So you can argue sending a message to Fiorito all you want. You can't argue about sending a message to the city of Chicago because I don't think that's an appropriate argument.

MS. HAMILTON: Judge, just as a point of clarification, the jury instruction, I believe, allows us to say sending a message to Officer Fiorito and any other officers.

THE COURT: And others like him, yes, others similar.

Whatever the lingo of the instruction is, that's fine. 1 2 MS. HAMILTON: Thank you. 3 THE COURT: Reference -- number 4 is reference to 4 settlement or disposition of other lawsuits. That's not objected to, so we don't need to talk about that. 5 6 Number 5 is lost wages. Okay. So having read what 7 both sides --8 Let me ask you this. What is he going to say? What do you think he's going to say as you stand there right now? 9 10 MS. HAMILTON: Yes. 11 THE COURT: Let me rephrase the question in that way. 12 MS. HAMILTON: Mr. Dean holds a very strong belief 13 that the fact that he has brought this lawsuit has impacted 14 his ability to get certain grants and perform certain 15 contracts and that he has, therefore, lost certain 16 opportunities as a result. And he believes he has been told 17 by --18 THE COURT: By whom? 19 MS. HAMILTON: By some representative from the city 20 of Chicago that they're not going to consider, even consider 21 any of his applications if he is a litigant against the City. 22 THE COURT: Has he ever identified --23 But this came up in his deposition, I'm assuming, 24 right? 25 MS. ATKINS: Yes.

1 THE COURT: Because Mr. Dean, I'm sure, didn't 2 hesitate to tell anybody about it. 3 Did somebody ask him who's the person who told you 4 this? 5 MS. ATKINS: They did. 6 THE COURT: What did he say? 7 MS. ATKINS: He didn't identify them. 8 THE COURT: Did he say, I don't know, I don't remember, or I won't tell you, or what? 9 10 MS. ATKINS: No. I believe he said: It was a 11 representative of your client, I mean, the City. 12 THE COURT: Okay. And so let's assume you get past 13 the problems that are inherent in that. What is it that he's 14 going to say that he lost? It's not going to be that he had 15 some contract that was taken away. 16 MS. HAMILTON: Correct. 17 THE COURT: It's going to be, I didn't get a 18 contract. 19 MS. HAMILTON: Yes, I believe so. I believe -- and 20 as your Honor is well aware, it's a little difficult to answer 21 that question. 22 THE COURT: I understand. 23 Do you want to contribute anything, Ms. Li? 24 MS. LI: At one point Dean did tell me. 25 identified a person, I believe the name was Ann, who told him

that --

THE COURT: Just the first name?

MS. LI: Just the first name.

THE COURT: As we would say in criminal law, Ann Lnu, L-n-u, last name unknown.

MS. LI: And then it was at some housing meeting, and I went to the website he referred me to. I couldn't find it. I couldn't find any transcript. I couldn't find any other further information about this.

THE COURT: Just as an aside, there was a criminal complaint filed last week. The actual official title of it on the docket is U.S. v. Fnu Lnu, first name unknown, last name unknown. Fnu Lnu. I'm not making it up. You can go on the recently filed cases and you will see it. It was last week.

Okay. Is there any other lost income evidence other than what you have just talked about? Are there other topics of lost income? I mean, was he making -- did he have a job where he had wages where he, you know, didn't come into work, he wasn't able to come into work because he had to go to court or anything like that? I mean, I remember Mr. Dean saying at some point that he was in the real estate business.

Did he say that there was some sale that he couldn't close because he had to concentrate on going to court, anything like that?

MS. LI: No.

1 And what complicates this, as was discussed in the 2 deposition, he was employed as a real estate broker at a firm. 3 He was terminated from that position several months before 4 this incident happened. 5 THE COURT: Before this. 6 MS. LI: He also had a nonprofit. 7 He was working on his own for homeless veterans is 8 what he's going to testify to. He was unable to assist his 9 clients because of this. He was unable to get the contracts 10 needed or get or have the ability to even see the buildings he 11 needed to see in order to submit the contracts needed. 12 THE COURT: Because of this being that he had --13 MS. LI: Because of the lawsuit that he filed, this 14 lawsuit, and that's what he's going to say. 15 THE COURT: Wait a second. I'm not talking about 16 what he's attributing to other people having told. I'm 17 focusing on what you just said, and it sounded like to me that 18 part of what you were just saying is that he had this 19 nonprofit and there were certain things that he couldn't do 20 because of this. 21 MS. LI: Because of this. 22 THE COURT: The "this" is the lawsuit. 23 MS. LI: Correct. 24 THE COURT: And is the "this" the fact that he had to

spend so much time on the lawsuit?

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1 MS. LI: On this current lawsuit, yes. 2 THE COURT: Yes. 3 MS. LI: Not the DUI. 4 THE COURT: Not the DUI but the lawsuit. 5 MS. LI: Yes. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MS. HAMILTON: Well, it's, of course, our position 8 that this lawsuit resulted from. 9 THE COURT: I understand, okay. 10 So let's just put that part to the side for a second 11 and just talk about the other stuff. So the problem I have 12 with the testimony about I was, you know, basically cut out of 13 the ability to get other contracts or business with the City, 14 it strikes me that it's too speculative to be relevant that he 15 actually would have gotten those contracts. 16 It's not directly analogous, but there is a doctrine 17 in Illinois law which is oftentimes followed in federal court 18 having to do with getting lost profits for a business that's a 19 start-up. And the general rule is -- it doesn't apply in 20 every case. But the general rule is is that you can't get 21 lost profits for a lost business opportunity for a startup 22 because there's nothing like a track record and there's no way 23 of proving, you know, what you would have gotten. 24 This strikes me as a similar situation except more so

because it's not just that he would have had to have bid on

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the contract; he then would have had to win the contract, you know, get through all of the approvals, actually perform and actually get money. We don't know when any of those contracts were.

That lost income evidence just strikes me as way too speculative, so I'm excluding it under Rule 402 but really more Rule 403.

As far as the rest of it is concerned, I guess what I -- now that you have a clear sense, I think, on the defense side of what you're talking about -- and let me just sort of describe it in a nutshell so that we're all on the same page. He's saying that because of the improper arrest and the malicious prosecution, I filed this lawsuit, and because I had to spend all this time on this lawsuit, I was not able to do A, B, C and D. Okay.

Let's cut out of it that nobody gave me a contract because of the lawsuit because he can't testify about that. That's what I think I just said. What I do not know is whether what I just described would be sort of within the realm of what you would call proximate cause. I just don't know. There may be law about this, so I'm going to need you to try to find something for me. And we'll talk about this more at another point in time before anybody has to give an opening statement.

Number 6. Bar evidence regarding medical,

psychiatric treatment and bills, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. And the plaintiff doesn't object to putting in evidence about medical or psychiatric treatment or having incurred medical bills. And the plaintiff, you don't object to that. The part you object to is basically him being able to say, I wasn't able -- I had all these symptoms, but I wasn't able to go seek care because I didn't have any money.

MS. HAMILTON: Correct.

THE COURT: What's wrong with that?

MS. ATKINS: Well, your Honor, his lack of funds doesn't stem from this lawsuit.

THE COURT: Yes, I understand.

MS. ATKINS: As counsel just said, he lost his primary source of income months before he was arrested.

THE COURT: Here is the way I see this playing out. It's one of two things. He's going to get on the stand and testify, I was depressed, I had sleepless nights, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. It may be that the direct ends there and then somebody gets up on cross and says: Were you ever treated by a doctor? And you say, no. He says, no.

And then the redirect is: Why weren't you treated by a doctor? I didn't have any money. I couldn't afford to go get treated by a doctor.

Okay. So that's way number one that it would come up. Let's assume that knowing that, you don't ask that

question on cross. And since Ms. Hamilton knows that you're not going to ask the question on cross, she says on direct, did you ever seek treatment for it, because she figures, well, a juror might say, wait a second, the guy says he has sleepless nights. Why didn't he ever go get treated for it? And she wants to be able to explain that.

I think it's legitimate. You can do it. I think it's perfectly legitimate. You can do it. Okay.

Number 7. Reference to other encounters with Officer Fiorito. That is the White Palace Grill. That is not objected to.

Reference to media coverage. So the plaintiff says they don't object except to the extent it's used for impeachment purposes. And I guess, for me, that's good enough for now with the caveat that if you decide you're going to want to go into something for impeachment purposes, you must bring it up at a sidebar first.

MS. HAMILTON: Understood.

THE COURT: Number 9, to bar reference to witnesses not in the pretrial order. Who exactly are we talking about?

So this whole thing about, if you don't have it in the draft of the pretrial order, it's out, that's baloney.

Come on. Seriously, it's just baloney.

So is there somebody who is not in the pretrial order aside from Lopez, which we have talked about, that you think

that the plaintiff's going to call that you think wasn't disclosed in some, you know, in the 26(a)(1s)?

MS. ATKINS: No.

THE COURT: Okay. So I don't think we have an issue to talk about that.

Bar any testimony or evidence regarding the Monell claim. Well, I think that's probably wrapped up with this thing about other act evidence, so we'll just table that for now.

Number 11 is bar testimony, reference or evidence of other DUI officers or other police misconduct. There is no objection to that, so that one's granted.

Number 12 is bar any testimony, reference or evidence of alleged motive based on race or sexual orientation. Well, he can say the thing about what he contends Fiorito told him, the use of the N word and other words, and the testimony that is referenced from his deposition in the response.

So the thing that I guess I have a question about is the sexual orientation evidence, and it kind of goes back to what I asked before. So what I was told before when I asked questions about this, in other words, earlier today, is I was told that Fiorito didn't say anything about his sexual orientation and that there's not -- that there's not going to be any testimony that Fiorito would have even had any reason to understand whatever Mr. Dean's sexual orientation is.

1 Did I catch that right? 2 MS. HAMILTON: We don't believe that there would be 3 testimony. 4 THE COURT: Okay. So how is evidence about his 5 sexual -- how is evidence about sexual orientation as a motive 6 even relevant then? 7 MS. HAMILTON: I don't think it is, Judge. 8 sorry. 9 THE COURT: There you go, fine. That one is granted. 10 Number 13. Evidence of a grand jury investigation. 11 There is no objection to that, so that's granted. 12 Number 14 is the thing about the summary suspensions. 13 Okay. So I think you are correct that the Hurlburt case, 14 H-u-r-l-b-u-r-t, just talks about collateral estoppel effect 15 or what people in a more modern way call issue preclusion. Ι 16 get that. 17 So what's the basis for admissibility? So what 18 you're talking about here is it's classic hearsay. It's an 19 out-of-court statement by somebody saying there was no 20 probable cause, and you want to put this out-of-court 21 statement in to prove that there was no probable cause. 22 MS. HAMILTON: Well, so my argument on this, Judge, 23 is that there is obviously a malicious prosecution claim. And 24 my understanding of the law -- I'm sure your Honor will 25 correct me if I am wrong about this -- but malicious

prosecution requires that the defendant either initiated or 1 2 caused to continue judicial proceedings against the plaintiff. 3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 MS. HAMILTON: So my position and my argument to your 5 Honor is that he actually initiated two different types of 6 judicial proceedings. 7 THE COURT: Oh, so both the DUI and the summary 8 judgment. 9 MS. HAMILTON: Yes, sir. 10 Therefore, the finding on the statutory summary 11 suspension is relevant to the malicious prosecution claim with 12 respect to the fact that, you know, it was terminated in the 13 plaintiff's favor. 14 THE COURT: In a manner consistent with innocence 15 even. 16 MS. HAMILTON: Correct. 17 THE COURT: Interesting. How about that? 18 MS. ATKINS: It's a very novel argument, your Honor. 19 It's our position that introduction of this finding 20 at the summary suspension hearing will do nothing but confuse 21 It is their job to determine whether or not the 22 elements of malicious prosecution as they're being presented 23 in this litigation have been met, and, you know, beyond what 24 your Honor called classic hearsay. 25 THE COURT: Yes, but, I mean, it's actually being

offered for another purpose is what Ms. Hamilton has told me. 1 2 It's being offered for the purpose of showing that this other 3 litigation was terminated in his favor in a manner consistent 4 with innocence. 5 MS. SHARIFI: May I say something, your Honor? 6 THE COURT: Yes. 7 MS. SHARIFI: One thing, also, is that summary 8 suspension is not a termination of the underlying DUI 9 Mr. Dean -prosecution. 10 THE COURT: It's a separate case is what Ms. Hamilton 11 was saying. 12 MS. SHARIFI: However, Mr. Dean's DUI prosecution 13 continued after summary suspension indicating that this non-14 probable cause finding had to do simply with the termination 15 of his driving privileges absent from whether --16 THE COURT: I get that. Summary suspensions are 17 determined by the secretary of state, right? 18 MS. HAMILTON: Yes, but it's a separate --19 THE COURT: No, no, I understand. 20 So let me restate the argument because I want to make 21 sure I'm getting it right. So what you're saying is that 22 Fiorito didn't just initiate one case. 23 MS. HAMILTON: Correct. 24 THE COURT: The DUI case. He initiated two cases,

the DUI case and the summary suspension case.

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1 MS. HAMILTON: Correct. 2 THE COURT: The DUI case we have had discussion about 3 how that was terminated and so on. What you are saying here 4 is that, well, the malicious prosecution claim extends to both 5 of these things. 6 MS. HAMILTON: Yes. 7 THE COURT: And we want to prove that the summary 8 suspension case was terminated in his favor in a manner consistent with innocence, and that's why the finding of the 9 10 hearing officer, or whoever it was, is pertinent. 11 MS. HAMILTON: It's a judge. It's the same judge 12 that --13 THE COURT: It's the same judge. 14 MS. HAMILTON: It's a judicial proceeding. 15 THE COURT: Judicial proceeding. 16 MS. HAMILTON: Yes, it's a proceeding that is 17 instituted to revoke driving privileges, and it's a judicial 18 proceeding. 19 THE COURT: What did they do, Ms. Jackson, take your 20 office away from you? 21 MR. ERICKSON: It's separate and distinct. 22 THE COURT: What about that? I mean, facially at 23 least, that makes sense to me. 24 MS. ATKINS: Well, your Honor, first and foremost, 25 isn't it the plaintiff who initiated the summary suspension

hearing?

THE COURT: I don't know. I mean, I assume that that all flows from the fact that he gets a DUI ticket.

MS. HAMILTON: Judge, the law enforcement's forum report is what initiates, and it's not that the plaintiff initiated. The plaintiff did ask for a hearing, but the proceedings to revoke his driver's license were initiated.

THE COURT: Does that all happen because he didn't take the Breathalyzer, or is it irrespective of whether he takes the Breathalyzer?

MR. ERICKSON: It's dependent upon that.

THE COURT: So if he had taken the Breathalyzer --

In other words, not taking a Breathalyzer is a basis for instituting a summary suspension.

MR. ERICKSON: His refusal to take a Breathalyzer causes the officer to fill out a form called a law enforcement forum report and notices under suspension --

THE COURT: That's what I've always understood.

MS. HAMILTON: Right.

MS. ATKINS: Your Honor, if I may, refusal to blow, as I understand the relevant statutes, results in an automatic suspension. And so it's not that Officer Fiorito said, oh, I'm going to fill out this paper.

THE COURT: You're saying that Mr. Dean started the summary suspension proceeding on himself? Nobody is that

1 stupid. 2 MS. ATKINS: Mr. Dean requested the summary 3 suspension hearing that Ms. Hamilton --4 THE COURT: He requested a hearing, but that's just 5 like saying, I want to go to trial on my criminal case. That 6 doesn't mean he started the criminal case. 7 MS. ATKINS: Sure. But --8 THE COURT: Let me ask you this direct question. 9 MS. ATKINS: Yes. 10 THE COURT: What is it that you --11 You don't have a summary suspension proceeding unless 12 you're charged with DUI, right? 13 MS. ATKINS: Sure. 14 THE COURT: He was charged with DUI by the ticket 15 that Officer Fiorito gave him, right? 16 MS. ATKINS: Right. 17 THE COURT: So Fiorito initiated the summary 18 suspension. I think the plaintiff is right on this. Okay. 19 So I'm going to give you a chance to think about it a little 20 bit more. And if you have got something else to give me, I 21 will let you file a reply on that issue by Friday. This is on 22 number 14. 23 MS. ATKINS: Thank you, your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Okay. And that is all of the plaintiffs' 25 stuff, and I think actually we may be able to get through most

1 of the --2 That's all of the defendants' motions. 3 MS. HAMILTON: We filed one yesterday, Judge. 4 MS. ATKINS: We did file --5 THE COURT: Oh, right, I saw that. 6 MS. ATKINS: -- a 15th one. 7 THE COURT: Right, right, right. 8 MS. HAMILTON: Which basically is going to come up anyways on plaintiffs' number 1, so you can kind of deal with 9 10 them at the same time, plaintiffs' first motion in limine 11 about arrests, subsequent -- prior and subsequent arrests. 12 THE COURT: Pause for a second. Let me just pull it 13 up here. I didn't bring it out with me. 14 (Brief interruption.) THE COURT: Okay, relates to plaintiffs' motion in 15 16 limine number 1. Now I get it. 17 MS. HAMILTON: Yes. 18 THE COURT: We'll take Defendants' 15 in connection 19 with the plaintiffs' motions in limine. 20 So the argument -- so plaintiffs' motion in limine 21 number 1 has to do with arrests that did not result in 22 convictions, which is also what defendants' motion in limine 15 concerns, right? 23 24 MS. HAMILTON: Yes, Judge. 25 THE COURT: Okay. So articulate for me the theory on which the arrest that didn't result in the conviction would be relevant. You have done it, but do it again here so that we have something to set the scene.

MS. ATKINS: Our argument is focused on Mr. Dean's two arrests that took place subsequent to his arrest by Officer Fiorito.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. ATKINS: It has been Mr. Dean's position throughout this litigation that he was not driving the vehicle voluntarily, that he was forced to do so, that he blindly follows the instructions of law enforcement.

The two subsequent arrests, one in May, I believe it was May of 2011 -- or excuse me -- June of 2011 and the second in May of 2012, both involved charges of --

THE COURT: Trespass to property.

MS. ATKINS: -- criminal trespass, and one was also disorderly conduct in addition to the criminal trespass.

One was at a Starbucks; the other was at the secretary of state's office, the administrative hearing officer.

THE COURT: So I'm going to assume that what happened there is that -- particularly given the disorderly charge on the one -- that Mr. Dean was in these places. It wasn't like he went in after hours or broke in or anything like that. He was there and there was some sort of a disturbance.

MS. ATKINS: Absolutely, your Honor.

THE COURT: So, in other words, it wasn't that he didn't have authority to enter; it was he exceeded the scope of his authority.

MS. ATKINS: He outwore his welcome. And when he was asked to leave, he got, according to the reports, belligerent and loud and aggressive and refused to leave, and it required the police to remove him.

THE COURT: Okay. So this is what ties in with the theory that you just articulated, is that you think that the fact that he didn't leave when he was asked to at the Starbucks and at the secretary of state's office has some bearing on the accuracy or inaccuracy of his claim that he followed Fiorito's instructions because Fiorito told him to.

MS. ATKINS: No. It's my argument, your Honor, that while Mr. Dean says that he always obeys police officers and law enforcement officers, and that's why he simply got into the car, knowing that it was impounded, knowing that he didn't have a right to drive the car. Here he has two subsequent instances where he didn't heed the direction of police blindly.

THE COURT: Then I'm guess I'm not getting it. So you're not tying it -- you're not saying that this is relevant because it undercuts his account of what he did in the incident. You're saying that it's relevant -- and I'm looking

at page 2 of your motion right now, motion number 15. You're saying that it's relevant because -- or to the extent that Mr. Dean gets on the witness stand and says that, because of what happened to me here, I always do what law enforcement tells me to do.

That's what the second paragraph on page 2 of your motion says.

MS. ATKINS: Well, your Honor --

THE COURT: So which is it?

MS. ATKINS: Let me just clarify. Mr. Dean's position has been, even before he interacted with Officer Fiorito, that he always complied with law enforcement, and he continued to act in that manner with Officer Fiorito, and that's why he got into the car.

THE COURT: I understand. But you actually think that the plaintiffs' lawyer is going to elicit from him -- I mean, this would be like a "Law & Order" moment where the person -- where the defense lawyer steps into the big bucket of you know what, where the judge has already excluded all of the other act evidence, and either the defense lawyer or the defendant who is on the witness stand steps into the big bucket of you know what when he or she says, oh I always do X, Y or Z. And then Jack McCoy stands up and says, aha, what about, you know, the other four murders that you committed the week before last.

Okay. That's not likely to happen, all right, in real life. It doesn't -- you know, it doesn't even -- well, it doesn't even happen in criminal cases, but whatever.

MS. ATKINS: If I may, in addition to that, I understand that you would expect it not to happen, but I would have been remiss had I not --

THE COURT: Well, and again --

MS. ATKINS: -- brought it up.

THE COURT: -- to the extent Mr. Dean, you know, might tend to run on, as he has in court on a couple of occasions, and I'm not talking about any settlement conferences; I'm just talking about appearances in court. Well, okay.

MS. HAMILTON: Judge, clearly, if you just read the actual words of their motion, they clearly are seeking to introduce these subsequent arrests as propensity evidence. It basically just says that in the bottom of the second page of their motion.

Dean says: Plaintiffs' subsequent arrest for criminal trespass and disorderly conduct, breach of peace, is permissible to corroborate the defendants' position that the plaintiff was acting in such an erratic and unreasonable manner that a reasonable officer" blah-blah-blah.

THE COURT: May I ask this question? What became of the June 2011 trespass and disorderly charge? What became of

it? 1 2 MS. HAMILTON: The most recent arrest is still 3 pending. 4 THE COURT: The one in 2011. 5 MS. HAMILTON: I think everything has been dismissed 6 except there's the most recent one is still pending. 7 THE COURT: Okay. So Mr. Dean presumably -- the one that is still pending, let's put that to the side. 8 9 Presumably what Mr. Dean is going to say, if I let 10 you put this in, and you say, well, isn't it a fact, Mr. Dean, that on June the 28th of 2011, you went into a Starbucks and 11 12 they asked you to leave, and then the police came and you 13 refused to leave and started screaming and yelling and 14 creating a disturbance, he's going to say, oh, no, that did 15 not happen that way. 16 All right. So then what's going to happen? Are you 17 going to call the cop? Are you going to call the barista? 18 I'm just asking. 19 MS. ATKINS: If I need to. 20 THE COURT: Well, do you know who they are? 21 MS. ATKINS: Yes. They were the complainants, signed 22 complainants. 23 Have they been subpoenaed for trial? THE COURT: 24 MS. ATKINS: They have not. I just received this 25 information yesterday.

1 THE COURT: Okav. 2 MS. ATKINS: Mr. Dean never supplemented any 3 information relative to his arrest. 4 THE COURT: Is it correct that the June 2011, charge 5 was dismissed, SOL'd or whatever? MS. ATKINS: The May 2011 -- or June 2011 I have as 6 7 June 28th, 2011, SOL'd, bail bond forfeiture, SOL'd. 8 THE COURT: Okay. So the line on the half sheet, it 9 says BF/SOL, right? 10 MS. HAMILTON: That means, Judge --11 THE COURT: I know exactly what it means. Been 12 there, done that. 13 MS. HAMILTON: The witness and the plaintiff didn't 14 show up. 15 THE COURT: Nobody showed up. 16 MS. HAMILTON: Right, right. 17 THE COURT: Right, okay. All right. 18 MS. ATKINS: But, your Honor, if I may just also add, 19 it does go toward Mr. Dean's claims of emotional damages. 20 THE COURT: In what way? 21 MS. ATKINS: In the sense that, you know, if he --22 Again, we're talking about ifs and buts here, and I hate to do that, but it's hard to anticipate what Mr. Dean may 23 24 say. 25 But if he does start to talk about, I've never

behaved this way, I was so emotionally scarred by this instance, I'm afraid of the police, I would never behave in such a manner, I can't get out of bed, I can't do this, I can't do that, and then he's --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ATKINS: -- arrested subsequently.

THE COURT: Here's my view on this.

So putting aside testimony along the lines of what you just described, I really do think that this is propensity evidence. It's nothing like any of the events that happened here, you know, at least not close enough alike to be -- to constitute modus operandi evidence or something like that or anything else that make it a properly admissible thing under 404(b).

If, on the other hand, Mr. Dean, unthinkingly or even thinkingly or something in between, says something at trial along the lines of the "oh, I would never or I never have" type of statement that you just described, then he potentially will be opening the door to this.

And what the rule will be is just as I said to Ms. Hamilton, if you think he's opened the door, you ask for a sidebar, we discuss it at a sidebar. And I'm going to assume, just as you're going to talk to your witnesses about all the little doors they may open, that you're going to do your best to talk to Mr. Dean about all those little doors, and some not

so little, that may be opened and so on, okay.

So number 1 is granted subject to, you know, further developments at trial, let's just put it that way.

Number 2, in-court statements while he was unrepresented. Well, what I got from the response to this motion is you probably don't intend to put in any because the response to the motion is what the heck are they talking about.

MS. HAMILTON: Exactly.

MS. ATKINS: Well, we don't know what they're talking about.

THE COURT: Well, let me just say this. So, first of all, it doesn't appear to me that there's any intention to put in any of this stuff.

Second of all, it's going to be -- it's going to be relatively difficult, I will say, to convince me that you should -- that you should allow Mr. Dean -- that I should allow into evidence something that Mr. Dean may have said at a status hearing or in connection with a motion to appoint counsel or during the period of time that he was pro se.

You know, part of that may be I guess I wouldn't have probably given him the judicial equivalent of the Miranda warnings, not that they necessarily apply because he's certainly not in custody and it's not a criminal proceeding, but I just don't think that that would be particularly fair

because we were having, you know, what I think would be fairly described as wide-ranging discussions, talking about what's going on with this case, why don't you have a lawyer and things like that, and I just don't think it would be fair to then, you know, jam him with statements that he might have made in that regard, plus you don't have anything specific anyway.

Number 3. So I'm assuming Fiorito isn't going to be wearing a dress uniform since he's retired, right?

MR. KOWALCZYK: Correct.

THE COURT: And the response to this motion basically said we're not planning to put that in unless, of course, all of this stuff about prior misconduct comes in, in which case we certainly reserve the right to say, wait a second, he has gotten this accommodation and that accommodation. I would assume that if I allow in the prior evidence of bad conduct that you wouldn't -- that you're not going to argue that he can't put in the good stuff.

MS. HAMILTON: Under the rules they can --

THE COURT: Yes, okay.

So is there anything else that anybody thinks I have to decide on that motion?

MS. HAMILTON: No, Judge.

MS. ATKINS: Your Honor, we had raised one issue about -- because in the motion they had referenced Officer

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Fiorito's personal experiences as being something that they wanted to bar inclusion of or testimony regarding, and not knowing exactly what it was that they were referencing with personal experiences. I took the avenue in my response to simply say his personal experience in his professional capacity such as -- you know, his experiences that would lead to the decisions that he made relative to Mr. Dean.

So what is he going to say like that?

THE COURT: Well, we're three days before trial. When are you going to know? When are you going to know,

MS. ATKINS: Well, no. Seriously, your Honor, if we're talking about what led up to the probable cause, I think that Officer Fiorito should certainly be able to talk about the circumstances he faced with Dean and his personal experiences in similar situations. So it's more of his professional experience relative to effectuating arrests, assessing persons, et cetera.

THE COURT: What else would you like to tell me? MS. HAMILTON: My only response to that, Judge, is that, in my opinion, we could be walking a very close line to opening a door if Officer Fiorito decides to testify about his vast experience.

THE COURT: Well, you're taking the words right out

of my mouth.

So here's the deal. You know, I can certainly understand circumstances in which how an officer perceives a particular event might be influenced based on the officer's experience, okay. And so I don't think that I'm in a position to say that it is not relevant.

Having said that, the more Officer Fiorito talks about his experience, the more about his experience is going to be relevant, and that includes bad as well as good. And so, again, I'm just going to --

And I haven't ruled yet on the other act stuff, but let's assume for purposes of discussion that I end up excluding the other act evidence, all of the other act evidence, and some of it I've already excluded. Who knows? Officer Fiorito may say something in testifying about his, you know, vast experience and what he's seen that might open the door to some of the things that I have excluded. So that could happen.

I think as I sit here right now, I mean, my ruling is I'm not prepared to say that every possible thing having to do with his experience is irrelevant, so I'm going to deny the motion, but, you know, people have to understand that doors can get opened by anybody. Okay.

So moving on, and we're going to try to finish this here because we're actually pretty close.

1 MS. HAMILTON: Okay. 2 THE COURT: Number 3 -- number 4, rather, is can you 3 ask leading questions to police officers. The answer is sure, 4 you can. That's fine. 5 MS. HAMILTON: Thank you. 6 THE COURT: Number 5, failure to file tax returns. 7 So, I mean, if no evidence comes in about lost wages, 8 it tends to drop out of the picture, right? And it sounds 9 like there is no evidence about lost wages because the 10 nonprofit stuff really isn't about wages. 11 MS. HAMILTON: Right. 12 THE COURT: So I think the tax return thing is a 13 nonissue. 14 And so what is the issue about Public Aid? 15 If he is utilizing any right now, I MS. HAMILTON: 16 would just like it not to be asked about. 17 THE COURT: Are you going to ask him about that? 18 MS. ATKINS: I didn't even know he was utilizing it, 19 your Honor. 20 THE COURT: I mean, even if you did, it would not be 21 a really particularly intelligent thing to ask because you 22 might have jurors who have friends, relatives and other people 23 who are under Public Aid and would be offended by that. So 24 I'm going to assume that's not going to come up, and if it is,

just tell me before you do it so that I can deal with it.

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Other lawsuits. So the one thing here that I thought, you know, had some potential relevance and probative value is referred to on page 5 of the defendants' response. It's a case called Dean v. Draper and Kramer in which Mr. Dean allegedly said in a notice of appeal that he suffers from clinical depression as a result of whatever it is he contended that Draper and Kramer did to him. And he was terminated, you know, approximately around the same time as the incident in this case. And he's contending that he's suffered emotional distress and depression as a result of what happens here.

So my question is: Why wouldn't it be relevant for the defendant to bring up in questioning Mr. Dean, well, you have testified about all this depression; isn't it a fact that you attribute your depression to conduct at the hands of your former employer, Draper and Kramer?

MS. HAMILTON: I think that just bringing up the fact that there's a prior lawsuit is what I'm taking issue with. I understand, your Honor, what your reference is to, and that does seem fair if it's part of his depression that had something to do with this previous termination. But that would be enough. We don't have to inform the jury that involved a previous lawsuit.

I'm concerned about the jury hearing and believing that Mr. Dean is litigious, and there's been case law that that is unfairly prejudicial. And so if your Honor is inclined to let that in at all, I would ask that it be --

THE COURT: So let me play it out for you this way.

Let's say what happens is that I agree with you and I say you
can bring up defendant's -- you can bring up that Mr. Dean has
attributed his depression to a different -- to the conduct of
his former employer, Draper and Kramer, okay.

And let's say if he says, yes, that's right, then we're done. If he says anything other than, yes, that's right, then if he tries to hedge, or if he tries to explain, or if he tries to say, well, that's different, then where are we? And that would --

Honestly, with any witness, there would be some risk of that happening.

MS. HAMILTON: Absolutely, Judge. And, obviously, I would endeavor not to open a door about the actual lawsuit.

I mean, I think that it would be fair to ask him, and I would actually probably ask him myself to front it, that, you know, that he also was depressed over having lost his job. I think that's fair. I think that is a fair thing for the defendants to get out, to be able to argue that his depression that he suffered -- he's saying he's suffering from the arrest by Fiorito may also have been, you know, partly caused by this other event that has nothing to do with Officer Fiorito. That all seems fair to me.

What I would like to keep out and I think that there

is, you know, law to support --

THE COURT: Let's say you do it that way. Let's say you front it on direct and you say, Mr. Dean, isn't it fair to say that your depression is partly caused by the way you were treated by your former employer, and he says yes. Okay. Why wouldn't it be okay then at a minimum for the defendant on cross to say, Mr. Dean, I just want to go back to that for a second. Didn't you actually say in writing that your, quote, clinical depression has been a result of, close quote, what your former employer did to you?

MS. HAMILTON: Judge, I can't recall off the top of my head right now whether that was something that was written after the arrest.

THE COURT: It's got a -- mark in it.

MS. HAMILTON: Right, right, but was it something that Mr. Dean wrote after his arrest by Officer Fiorito?

THE COURT: Well, I would think so because the case wasn't filed until after this one. It's 09 C 4374, and the appeal is presumably after that.

MS. HAMILTON: Well, Judge, my response to that would just be -- I mean, I think that, you know, depression doesn't have to always be caused by one thing, and a layperson submitting documents to the Court in that situation, I mean --

THE COURT: That's a weight issue. It's relevant, okay. So here's what I'm going to permit you to do.

MS. HAMILTON: Okay.

THE COURT: What I'm going to permit the defendant to do is you -- at least without Mr. Dean in some way opening the door to it, you cannot bring up the fact that there was a lawsuit against Draper and Kramer because I think that is unfairly prejudicial, and it's going to get us all down the road into figuring out what that lawsuit is about.

You can bring up -- you can elicit that he has claimed that his clinical depression was a result of what Draper and Kramer did to him in connection with his employment. You can bring up that he has said that in writing. You can't bring up that he said that in a writing that he filed in court because then that gets us into lawsuit territory. And that's the extent of what you can do. Okay.

And even if the plaintiff brings this up on the direct examination, you can still do it in cross because you're not limited by the direct. And if you think that Mr. Dean says something either on the direct or on your cross that should broaden the scope of what you can get into, you will ask for a sidebar and I will address it.

MS. ATKINS: Your Honor, just for point of clarification, as to his depression, clinical depression, being the result of his treatment from Draper and Kramer or former employer, however --

THE COURT: You can say Draper and Kramer. I don't

1 care. 2 MS. ATKINS: May I refer to the racial discrimination 3 as the treatment, not mentioning the claims in the lawsuit? 4 But he specifically alleged both with the EEOC and this Court 5 that it was racial discrimination. THE COURT: So you're asking me can you bring up, 6 7 isn't it a fact, Mr. Dean, that you have claimed that you were 8 clinically depressed as a result of race discrimination by 9 Draper and Kramer? 10 MS. ATKINS: Yes, race discrimination and your termination from Draper and Kramer. He said he was terminated 11 12 because of his race. 13 MS. HAMILTON: I would object to that, Judge. 14 think that your reasoning for allowing in the fact that he 15 said he has clinical depression is --16 THE COURT: What does the race discrimination aspect add to it that's pertinent? 17 18 MS. ATKINS: Well, your Honor, if he's alleging 19 racial animus or racial discrimination on the part of Officer 20 Fiorito --21 MS. HAMILTON: That's propensity. 22 THE COURT: Let her finish the sentence. 23 MS. HAMILTON: All right.

MS. ATKINS: It's more of Mr. Dean's state of mind as to how he is consistently treated by others.

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1 THE COURT: That's propensity evidence. MS. ATKINS: Yes. 2 3 MS. HAMILTON: I'm sorry. 4 THE COURT: Next time just let people walk into it, 5 you know, okay. That's inadmissible. Number 7, dismissed claims. So I take it this is 6 7 only going to -- the thing about dismissed claims is only 8 going to come up, I take it, if I let in the other act 9 evidence? Am I right? 10 MS. ATKINS: I think it would just be Lopez. 11 THE COURT: Yes, okay. So we'll worry about that once I rule on Lopez. Somebody just needs to remind me. 12 13 MS. ATKINS: The motion also has to do with prior 14 claims that plaintiff brought. 15 THE COURT: You're not going to bring up claims that 16 he brought against Fiorito and the City and dropped, are you? 17 Mr. Kowalczyk. Look at him. 18 MS. ATKINS: No. 19 THE COURT: No, okay, fine. All right. 20 MS. ATKINS: I just got confused for a second. 21 THE COURT: Number 8, background checks. I'm told in 22 the response that you're not going to do them. 23 You're not going to do the ones that lawyers for 24 police officers have done in a number of other cases that 25 involve use of the CLEAR, all capitals, database?

1 MS. ATKINS: Not the CLEAR system, not LEADS, but if 2 there's Westlaw or --3 THE COURT: You're talking about doing normal sort of 4 Internet searches. 5 MS. ATKINS: Exactly. THE COURT: You don't have a problem with that 6 7 because you can do those, too. 8 MS. HAMILTON: No, Judge. I just don't want them to 9 use --10 THE COURT: You're telling me you're not going to use 11 CLEAR and LEADS and so --12 MS. ATKINS: Absolutely. 13 THE COURT: -- I'm taking your word for that. So I'm 14 denying that motion based on that representation. 15 Number 9, ability to pay punitive damages, and the 16 defendant is saying we're not offering that. And that ties in 17 with the issue about indemnification. And so, you know, if 18 you think that the defense has done something that brings that 19 into play, you will let me know. 20 Okay. So I've dealt with all the motions in limine, 21 I believe, except for the ones that I have tabled. 22 MS. HAMILTON: Yes, Judge. 23 THE COURT: And so you have in mind what it is you 24 have got to get me. 25 MS. HAMILTON: Yes, Judge.

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THE COURT: I don't have it in my mind right now, but I know that there's more. We have got to do some more talking about the other act evidence once you have gotten me the police reports and the deps of the two people plus Mr. Dean's police reports. And I want to say there was one other thing. Oh, you were going to give me some law on whether --MS. HAMILTON: Proximate cause. THE COURT: Yes, law on whether lost opportunities as a result of the lawsuit that he filed as a result of the alleged wrongful conduct is recoverable. So if you have got anything on that, get it to me by Friday sometime. MS. HAMILTON: Okay, sure. THE COURT: And the other stuff you're going to get to me -- the depositions and the police reports, you're going to get me first thing in the morning. MS. HAMILTON: Yes, Judge. MR. KOWALCZYK: Yes, your Honor. My clerk, she's going to get it to you. We'll have it for you tomorrow. THE COURT: Good. MS. HAMILTON: Judge, just really quickly. objections on the witness and exhibit lists that we need to

deal with still, and there is an issue where we need some

clarification on whether Officer Fiorito is going to be taking 1 the Fifth at trial, which we still don't know. 2 3 THE COURT: Is he? 4 MR. KOWALCZYK: It's my understanding that he is not, 5 Judge. Okay. All right, so let's do this. 6 THE COURT: Ι 7 can't do anything more with you today. MS. HAMILTON: That's fine. 8 9 THE COURT: You're going to have to come back 10 I can't do it on Friday because I've got other 11 things that I kind of booked in for Friday, and I'm going to 12 have to sort of squeeze you in into a particular slot 13 tomorrow. So let me tell you what that is. 14 MS. HAMILTON: Okay. 15 THE COURT: It's not pretty. 16 (Brief interruption.) 17 THE COURT: So what we need to talk about, you're 18 saying, are objections to witnesses that aren't tied up with 19 the motions in limine that I have carried over. MS. HAMILTON: Yes. 20 21 THE COURT: And then --22 MS. HAMILTON: There's exhibits that need to be ruled 23 on, too. We have a disputed exhibit book for you, too. 24 THE COURT: Okay, give me that. 25 MS. HAMILTON: Judge, it's all in the pretrial order,

all of our objections and whatnot. 1 2 THE COURT: Give me that and then come in at 10:30. 3 MS. HAMILTON: I think the defendants have their own 4 exhibits. 5 THE COURT: Yes, and I'm just going to tell you the odds of me ruling before trial on all of this stuff is 6 7 relatively slim. I may rule on some of it, but I'm probably 8 not going to rule on all of it before trial. 9 MS. HAMILTON: Okay. 10 THE COURT: So who wants to put in the "gentlemen, 11 this is vodka" sign? 12 MS. ATKINS: That would be plaintiff. 13 MS. HAMILTON: That's just a picture of the scene 14 where the car was. 15 THE COURT: Okay. You're not putting it in for the 16 sign, okay. 17 MS. HAMILTON: The point isn't the sign. 18 THE COURT: I mean, I don't know. 19 Okay. So you have got copies of your disputed 20 exhibits? 21 MS. ATKINS: Yes, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: I'm telling you, it's the only two things 23 that are going to be on the agenda for tomorrow. 24 MS. HAMILTON: 10:30, right? 25 THE COURT: 10:30, and I will tell you more tomorrow

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1	about other stuff regarding logistics and whatnot.
2	Okay, see you tomorrow.
3	MS. ATKINS: Thank you, your Honor.
4	MS. HAMILTON: Thank you, your Honor.
5	(Which were all the proceedings had in the above-entitled
6	cause on the day and date aforesaid.)
7	CERTIFICATE
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9	I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and
10	correct transcript of the above-entitled matter.
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13	/s/ Laura M. Brennan August 17, 2012
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15	Laura M. Brennan
16	Official Court Reporter Date Northern District of Illinois
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